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Emotional visual scenes are such powerful attractors of attention that they can disrupt per-
ception of other stimuli that appear soon afterward, an effect known as emotion-induced
blindness. What mechanisms underlie this impact of emotion on perception? Evidence
suggests that emotion-induced blindness may be distinguishable from closely related
phenomena such as the orienting of spatial attention to emotional stimuli or the central
resource bottlenecks commonly associated with the attentional blink. Instead, we suggest
that emotion-induced blindness reflects relatively early competition between targets and
emotional distractors, where spontaneous prioritization of emotional stimuli leads to sup-
pression of competing perceptual representations potentially linked to an overlapping point
in time and space.
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Most aspects of the environment resonate with emotional mean-
ing, so an understanding of perception in the real world neces-
sitates understanding how it is impacted by emotion. Evidence
suggests that emotional stimuli themselves attract attention more
robustly and are more readily detected than are non-emotional
stimuli (Anderson and Phelps, 2001; Öhman et al., 2001; Ander-
son, 2005; Vuilleumier and Huang, 2009), but less well understood
is the impact of emotional stimuli on the perception of neigh-
boring non-emotional information. In a sense, this dimension of
perception-emotion interactions is especially relevant to everyday
life, where – whether one is a soldier on patrol, an emergency room
technician, or a highly anxious individual surrounded by perceived
threats – it is important to attend to and process non-emotional
information despite the emotional context.
Unfortunately, the literature on perception-emotion interac-
tions often seems to contradict itself, with some studies showing
that emotional stimuli impair perception of contextually neigh-
boring targets and other studies showing that emotional stimuli
enhance perception of such targets. In the former case, for exam-
ple, studies have shown that when people search for a single target
embedded in a rapid, serially presented stream of pictures, the
presence of a task-irrelevant emotional picture robustly impairs
target perception for about a half-second, a phenomenon labeled
emotion-induced blindness (e.g., Most et al., 2005; Most and Jungé,
2008; Most and Wang, 2011; Kennedy and Most, 2012). In contrast,
other studies have shown that the presentation of a task-irrelevant
emotional face can subsequently enhance contrast sensitivity (a
function of early vision; Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanergra and Zee-
lenberg, 2009) and can facilitate visual search for targets (Becker,
2009). Findings that emotional stimuli can benefit subsequent
target perception are consistent with a recently proposed “arousal-
biased competition” account, which posits that emotional stimuli
bias subsequent perceptual competition in favor of high-priority
stimuli (which can be classified as “high-priority” by virtue of
either their inherent salience or their goal-relevance; Mather and
Sutherland, 2011).
But what of the cases where emotional stimuli disrupt per-
ception? Why should emotional stimuli enhance subsequent per-
ception of targets on some occasions but disrupt it on others? In a
sense, the competition processes posited within the arousal-biased
competition account might suggest insights into emotion-induced
blindness, as emotional stimuli themselves could be construed
as high-priority stimuli that compete with neighboring targets.
Indeed, recent work on emotion-induced blindness in our lab has
revealed some clues into the nature of such competition. To antic-
ipate, our evidence suggests that emotion-induced blindness may
stem from competition between targets and emotional distractors
and that the phenomenon primarily arises when targets and emo-
tional distractors jockey to be the dominant representation linked
to a given point in space and time.
EMOTION-INDUCED BLINDNESS
In a series of studies showing emotional disruption of conscious
perception, participants viewed rapid serial visual presentations
(RSVPs) of upright landscape and architecture photos at a rate of
10 images per second. They were instructed to search within each
stream for a landscape or architecture photo that was rotated 90˚
clockwise or counterclockwise and to report its orientation (see
Figure 1A). Depending on the trial, a task-irrelevant emotionally
negative, neutral, or scrambled negative picture preceded the tar-
get picture by either two (lag 2) or eight (lag 8) items (Most et al.,
2005). Emotionally negative distractors depicted aversive, highly
arousing scenes such as threatening animals, violence, or med-
ical trauma, whereas neutral images depicted people or animals
in ways that were not emotionally evocative. Scrambled versions
of the negative distractors served to control for the impact of
low-level visual properties such as color and luminance. Despite
the rapid presentation rate, participants were highly accurate in
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Example of part of a typical emotion-induced blindness trial,
where items are presented serially at a rate of 100 ms/item. Here, the
target is a landscape picture rotated 90˚ clockwise. The critical distractor is
an emotionally negative picture that appears two items before the target
(Lag 2). (B) A typical pattern of data (means and standard errors) from an
emotion-induced blindness experiment (from Most et al., 2005, Experiment
1). At Lag 2, accuracy in reporting the target’s orientation was worse
following emotional distractors than following neutral or scrambled
distractors. However, by Lag 8, performance in all distractor conditions had
recovered to above 90% accuracy.
reporting the target’s orientation at lag 8 (when the distractor
and the target appeared almost 1 s apart) regardless of distrac-
tor condition. However, at the earlier lag, emotionally negative
distractors induced greater deficits in target processing than did
the scrambled and neutral distractors (see Figure 1B). This pat-
tern – emotion-induced blindness – appears to reflect a disruption
of conscious perception rather than disrupted maintenance of
information in visual working memory, as the size of the effect
is comparable regardless of whether participants respond imme-
diately or withhold their response for a brief delay (Kennedy and
Most, 2012).
The fact that the scrambled versions of the negative pictures did
not induce spontaneous target perception impairments suggests
that the impairments elicited by the negative images stemmed from
their emotional nature rather than their low-level visual features.
This conclusion received further support from a study in which
emotionally neutral pictures that participants had learned to asso-
ciate with an aversive burst of white noise induced similar target
perception impairments (Smith et al., 2006). Both emotionally
negative and emotionally positive distractors appear capable of
driving the effect as long as they elicit a response of relatively
high arousal: in one set of experiments, the emotional distrac-
tors were erotic scenes – which are generally rated as emotionally
positive and highly arousing by both men and women (Bradley
et al., 2001; Lang et al., 2001) – and these stimuli consistently
elicited emotion-induced blindness effects similar to those caused
by negative distractors (Most et al., 2007).
DIFFERENTIATING EMOTION-INDUCED BLINDNESS FROM
RELATED PHENOMENA
In some respects, emotion-induced blindness is surprising within
the context of the extant literature. As mentioned above, the phe-
nomenon stands in contrast to findings that emotional stimuli can
facilitate perceptual processing of subsequent stimuli (Phelps et al.,
2006; Becker, 2009; Bocanergra and Zeelenberg, 2009). Because
all stimuli appear in the same spatial location in most emotion-
induced blindness tasks, the phenomenon also appears to contrast
with evidence that emotional stimuli facilitate the processing of
subsequent stimuli at their location by attracting or holding spa-
tial attention there (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg and Bradley,
1999; Fox et al., 2001; Jiang et al., 2006; Van Damme et al., 2008).
One possibility is that emotion-induced blindness reflects mecha-
nisms other than spatial attention or those involved in enhancing
early perception. But if so, what mechanisms might be involved?
On the surface, it seems likely that emotion-induced blindness
stems from the same mechanisms as the attentional blink (AB;
e.g., Raymond et al., 1992; Chun and Potter, 1995), a failure of
conscious perception that is widely studied in the visual cognition
literature (and which served as the model for the emotion-induced
blindness task). In a typical AB task, participants report two tar-
gets embedded in a rapid stream of non-targets (e.g., the identities
of two letters embedded in a stream of digits). If the two targets
appear far enough apart from each other in time, then people can
generally report both targets despite the rapid presentation speed.
However, if the second target appears within about half a second
after the first target, then people can generally report the first but
not the second target (cf. Potter et al., 2002). Dominant models of
the AB differ somewhat from each other in their details, but most
converge on the notion that the AB largely reflects the disruption or
distraction of relatively central, late-stage perceptual mechanisms,
whether such mechanisms involve a failure of consolidation into
visual working memory (e.g., Chun and Potter, 1995), a failure of
retrieval from memory (e.g., Shapiro et al., 1994), or disruption
of an attentional filter responsible for distinguishing targets from
non-targets (e.g., Di Lollo et al., 2005), among other accounts (but
also see Giesbrecht et al., 2007, for evidence of the flexibility of the
AB locus).
Based on such accounts of the AB, it might be expected that
emotion-induced blindness reflects the disruption of some rela-
tively central, high-level mechanism. However, in a recent series of
experiments, a surprising pattern of results suggested that – despite
its surface-level similarity to the AB – emotion-induced blindness
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might stem from mechanisms other than those often presumed
to drive the AB. In these experiments, participants searched for a
target that could appear in one of two simultaneously presented,
vertically aligned rapid streams instead of within a single stream.
The target was equally likely to appear in either stream, and the
critical distractor (a neutral or emotionally negative picture) was
equally likely to appear in the same stream as the target or in
the opposite stream. Results revealed that target perception was
worse following an emotional distractor only when the critical
distractor appeared in the same stream as the target (Most and
Wang, 2011). If emotion-induced blindness stemmed from the
disruption or distraction of a relatively late-stage, central process-
ing bottleneck, then the perceptual disruption should have been
equivalent regardless of the spatial relationship between the tar-
gets and critical distractors, as seems to be the case with the AB
(e.g., Shih, 2000; Lunau and Olivers, 2010; but see Kristjánsson
and Nakayama, 2002). The fact that the emotion-induced impair-
ment of target perception was greater at, compared to away from,
the location of the emotional distractor suggests that the mecha-
nisms underlying emotion-induced blindness may be dissociable
both from central bottlenecks involved in the AB and from the
spatial attention mechanisms that have been the focus of most
emotion-perception research over the past several decades.
Notably, further evidence for a dissociation between spatial
attention mechanisms and those underlying emotion-induced
blindness emerged from an emotion-induced blindness experi-
ment in which conditions that were more or less conducive to
spatiotemporal competition between targets and emotional dis-
tractors were manipulated. In most emotion-induced blindness
tasks, the targets and critical distractors are both embedded in the
middle of a rapid stream, rendering their temporal order hard to
judge and increasing the likelihood of the perceptual system link-
ing them to a common point in time and space. However, in this
follow-up experiment, the targets were sometimes the last item in
their stream (Most and Wang, 2011, Experiment 2). With no sub-
sequently appearing items masking the targets, the targets could
persist in iconic memory and their temporal relationship with
the critical distractors was rendered unambiguous. Under these
conditions, the spatial pattern of emotion-induced impairment
reversed, with target accuracy now worse away from – rather than
at – the location of the emotional distractor. This reversed pat-
tern is consistent with the large corpus of studies suggesting that
emotional distractors capture spatial attention and delay or other-
wise impair processing of targets at other locations. In other words,
when the hypothesized impact of spatiotemporal competition was
minimized, a dissociable impact of spatial attention appeared to
emerge.
A SPATIOTEMPORAL COMPETITION ACCOUNT OF
EMOTION-INDUCED BLINDNESS
Although the localization of emotion-induced blindness to the
location of an emotional distractor appears to run counter to what
might have been predicted on the basis of the spatial attention lit-
erature, it accords well with research on localized attentional inter-
ference (Mounts, 2000, 2005; Mounts and Gavett, 2004; Mounts
and Tomaselli, 2005; McCarley and Mounts, 2007; McCarley et al.,
2007; Mounts et al., 2007). This refers to the finding that processing
of one stimulus can impair processing of a second stimulus that
appears in close spatial proximity and that this impairment grows
stronger with decreasing distance between the two targets (also see
Cave and Zimmerman, 1997; Caputo and Guerra, 1998; Bahcall
and Kowler, 1999; Kristjánsson and Nakayama, 2002; Theeuwes
et al., 2004; Doran and Hoffman, 2010). Given the degree to which
such localized interference seems similar to the spatial pattern of
emotion-induced blindness, the mechanisms underlying it may
suggest insights into the nature of emotion-induced blindness.
Patterns of localized attentional interference are consistent with
an overarching “biased competition” model of attentional selec-
tion (e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Desimone, 1998), one of
the foundations of which is the recognition that visual stimuli in
a cluttered visual environment compete with each other to drive
the responses of neurons in the visual system. According to this
account, two or more simultaneously appearing stimuli will evoke
neural patterns of activation in parallel. When the stimuli lie far
apart enough in the visual field, they may evoke activity in min-
imally overlapping neuron populations. However, the smaller the
distance between the stimuli, the greater the overlap in the neuron
populations activated, leading to increased competition between
the neural representations. In this situation, selective attention is
conceptualized as a biasing of the competition in favor of one
stimulus over the others. This competition can be biased in bot-
tom up fashion – in favor of items that are visually salient – or by
top-down strategy – in favor of items that are goal-relevant (Des-
imone and Duncan, 1995; Desimone, 1998). Recordings of neural
activity have provided evidence consistent with the biased compe-
tition account. For example, visual cortical neurons that are highly
responsive to one stimulus are less responsive when a second, com-
peting stimulus simultaneously occupies their receptive fields, but
attention to either of the stimuli leads to a neural response sim-
ilar to that observed when the attended item appears alone (e.g.,
Chelazzi et al., 2001). Notably, receptive fields are small in early
regions of the visual cortex, where neural activity appears to be dri-
ven largely by low-level visual properties; however, they grow larger
in later, more anterior visual regions, which have been found to be
more globally responsive to complex stimuli such as objects and
faces (Desimone and Gross,1979; Gattass et al., 1981,1988; Kastner
and Ungerleider, 2000; Kastner et al., 2001). Competition between
neural representations has been observed in a number of regions,
including V1, V2, V4, and inferotemporal cortex, the hierarchical
organization of which suggests that competitive spatiotemporal
interactions could occur not only at the level of discrete features,
but also at the level of meaningful representations. Since the time
that the biased competition model of attention was first proposed,
empirical and theoretical advances have extended and refined it,
as reflected in (for example) more recent “normalization” and
“feature-similarity gain”models (e.g., Treue and Martinez-Trujillo,
1999; Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004; Lee and Maunsell, 2009;
Reynolds and Heeger, 2009). Nevertheless, the biased competi-
tion account provides a useful framework for understanding the
relatively limited number of emotion-induced blindness findings
to date, with a fuller consideration of the distinctions between
related models and their implications for emotion-induced blind-
ness likely to provide ever more insight as research on this topic
progresses.
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In an insightful review, Keysers and Perrett (2002) noted that –
when presented rapidly enough – temporally neighboring stimuli
within RSVP streams are likely to give rise to spatiotemporal
competition despite their sequentially presented nature. This is
because, even though the stimuli do not appear simultaneously
with each other, they elicit neural responses that themselves over-
lap in time. Framed within this context, spatial localization of
emotion-induced blindness makes sense. When a target appears
soon after an emotional distractor (or soon before; Most and
Jungé, 2008), the stimuli compete to be the dominant representa-
tion linked to an overlapping point in time and space. Because
of the human tendency to spontaneously prioritize emotional
stimuli, the distractor frequently dominates and suppresses visual
processing of the target.
Notably, if emotion-induced blindness arises due to compe-
tition between targets and emotional distractors, then it may be
possible to apply manipulations to either strengthen the bias for
emotional distractors or boost the competitive edge of targets,
thereby modulating – possibly via reentrant mechanisms (e.g.,
Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) – the degree of emotion-induced
blindness observed. In fact, this appears to be the case. For exam-
ple, in one experiment participants were informed in some blocks
that their target could be a rotated picture of either (a) a building
or (b) a landscape with no building, and in the remaining blocks
they were informed that their rotated target would always be a
picture of a building (Most et al., 2005, Experiment 2). The latter
case – labeled the “specific attentional set” condition – enabled
participants to establish a more concrete attentional template of
what their target would look like, and the results revealed that
emotion-induced blindness decreased in this condition, at least
among participants who had scored low in a measure associated
with trait anxiety. This is consistent with the notion that atten-
tional competition can be biased via goal-relevant information
held in working memory (e.g., Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Des-
imone, 1998). This instruction did not reduce emotion-induced
blindness among participants who had scored high in the anxiety-
related measure, however, perhaps because for them the bias to
prioritize emotional stimuli was more difficult to overcome.
Indeed, in another set of experiments, participants’ level of
anxiety was directly manipulated, with participants who reported
high levels of unease exhibiting greater emotion-induced blind-
ness than those who did not. In this set of experiments, male
and female romantic partners were seated at computers a few feet
away from each other. The female partner engaged in an emotion-
induced blindness task, first while her male partner rated the
attractiveness of landscape pictures and then while he rated the
attractiveness of women who ostensibly were single and on cam-
pus (although, in truth, the pictures had been gathered from the
internet and had no known relationship with the university). At
the end of the experiment, the female participants were asked
to rate their level of unease about the fact that their partner
had been rating other women; in two separate experiments, there
was a robust correlation between self-rated unease and emotion-
induced blindness (Most et al., 2010). Intriguingly, this correlation
emerged only when the distractors were emotionally negative, not
when they were emotionally positive. Moreover, self-rated unease
predicted emotion-induced blindness only during the time that
the male partner was rating the attractiveness of other women
and not when he was rating the attractiveness of landscapes,
helping to rule out individual differences unrelated to the manip-
ulation (e.g., the possibility that participants who experienced
unease also happened to be more sensitive to emotionally neg-
ative images in general). In short, such evidence is consistent with
the notion that emotion-induced blindness is driven by compe-
tition between target and emotional distractor representations:
whereas the competition can be skewed in favor of targets by
providing more descriptive information about their visual appear-
ance (Most et al., 2005, Experiment 2), it appears that anxiety can
enhance the bias in favor of emotional distractors (Most et al.,
2010).
ATTENTIONAL CAPTURE VS. EMOTIONAL CAPTURE
An important question regarding the nature of emotion-induced
blindness is whether the mechanisms underlying it are simply
identical to those that would be triggered by any attention-
capturing stimulus, or whether emotion-induced blindness
instead stems from processes triggered uniquely by the heightened
meaningfulness of the emotional distractor. While attention can
be captured by emotional stimuli, it can also be captured by stimuli
that either share a defining feature with the target (i.e., that match
participants’ “attentional set;” Folk et al., 1992; Folk and Rem-
ington, 1998) or by stimuli that are featurally salient or unique
in the environment (e.g., Yantis and Jonides, 1990; Theeuwes,
1991, 1992, 1994; Yantis, 1993). Within RSVP tasks, such non-
emotional, attention-grabbing stimuli have been found to induce
spontaneous attentional blinks for subsequent targets (Spalek
et al., 2006; Folk et al., 2007). Given the ability of non-emotional,
attention-capturing stimuli to induce spontaneous perceptual dis-
ruptions resembling those caused by emotional stimuli, it may be
that emotion-induced blindness simply reflects attentional cap-
ture rather than a more elaborate process through which emotion
impacts perception.
In a recent series of studies, we capitalized on the spatially local-
ized nature of emotion-induced blindness to examine whether
target perception impairments caused by emotional and non-
emotional, but attention-grabbing, distractors share common
underlying mechanisms (Wang and Most,2011;Wang and Most, in
preparation). If emotion-induced blindness stems simply from the
tendency of attention to spontaneously orient to emotional stim-
uli, then target perception deficits caused by the non-emotional,
attention-grabbing distractors should also be spatially localized.
To this end, we varied the nature of critical distractors in the dual-
stream RSVP paradigm. In a set of two experiments, participants
searched for a red letter embedded within one of two simulta-
neously presented rapid streams of white letters, and the critical
distractor (which could appear in either stream) was either a red
digit or a green letter. In a third experiment, participants searched
for a rotated color landscape photo embedded in one of two simul-
taneous streams of grayscale landscape photos, and the critical
distractor was an upright color landscape photo (thereby match-
ing participants’ attentional set for color). In all three cases, the
non-emotional, but attention-grabbing, distractors impaired sub-
sequent target perception, but this impairment was not spatially
localized.
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In a fourth experiment designed to ensure identical task
demands across conditions, the target was a rotated color land-
scape photograph embedded among rapidly presented, upright
grayscale landscape photos, and the distractor was either an
upright color landscape photo, an emotional color picture, or
a neutral non-landscape color photo. Target perception impair-
ments caused by the landscape and neutral color photos were not
spatially localized, but the impairments caused by the emotional
pictures were specific to the distractors’ location (Wang and Most,
2011; Wang and Most, in preparation).
In sum, although non-emotional, attention-grabbing distrac-
tors disrupted target perception, the spatially localized nature of
the impairment seemed to emerge specifically in the temporal
wake of emotional distractors. Our lab is currently in the process
of further verifying these results and testing whether they can be
accounted for by mechanisms other than spatiotemporal com-
petition. Thus far, the data are consistent with the suggestion
that emotion-induced blindness does not stem simply from the
tendency of attention to orient to emotional distractors. Neu-
roimaging studies along these lines would likely be fruitful, as the
behavioral findings to date yield intriguing predictions. Framed
in terms of neural architecture, competition between targets and
emotional distractors may involve relatively anterior visual brain
regions that are responsive to complex, meaningful representa-
tions, and such regions may function as the neural locus where
emotional stimuli gain a competitive edge.
CONCLUSION
Although emotional stimuli can sometimes facilitate perception
of subsequent items, they can also disrupt perception, yield-
ing results that seem contradictory at first glance. Research on
emotion-induced blindness and its underlying mechanisms can
help reconcile such discrepancies. For example, evidence suggests
that, consistent with a biased competition account of attention,
emotional disruption of perception may occur primarily when
emotional distractors and targets appear in such way as to be
linked by the visual system to overlapping points in time and
space. In the absence of such spatiotemporal competition, emo-
tional stimuli have sometimes been found to enhance perception
(e.g., see Bocanergra and Zeelenberg, 2009; Ciesielski et al., 2010).
Follow-up neurophysiological studies will greatly improve our
understanding of the neural locus of this competition; behav-
ioral evidence so far suggests that it may functionally lie earlier
than consolidation into working memory (evidenced, for exam-
ple, by patterns of spatial localization) but late enough in per-
ceptual processing to involve competition between meaningful
representations.
Of course, the impact of emotion on perception is multi-
faceted. Depending on the intensity of the emotional stimuli, the
conditions under which they appear, or the personality of the per-
ceiver, there may be circumstances where emotional stimuli impair
(or facilitate) perception of neighboring targets through relatively
central, late-stage mechanisms as well (e.g., consolidation into
visual working memory). The evidence reviewed in the present
discussion highlights potential spatiotemporal competition mech-
anisms; further characterization of the loci at which emotion can
impact visual processing holds promise for more fully understand-
ing the myriad ways that it can shape our conscious perception of
the world.
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